Update: Evening, Friday, November 20, 2026
The Saudi-led coalition announced today, Friday, November 20, the launch of a qualitative military operation against the Houthis in Yemen, amid escalating Houthi attacks on Saudi territory and significant developments on Yemen’s western coast – particularly since the Houthis’ advance toward Mokha and Dhubab last September, followed by Yemeni government force operations in October, coinciding with the ongoing US-Iran military confrontation.
I view this operation as part of a Saudi effort to regain military initiative, reduce Houthi threats to its territory and economic interests, and prevent the Houthis from consolidating their battlefield gains, particularly near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
I. Objectives of the Operation
1. Weakening Houthi missile and drone capabilities, and reducing their ability to target Saudi territory, economic facilities, and military installations.
2. Targeting Houthi command-and-control centers, weapons depots, and military supply networks, particularly in Sanaa, Saada, and Hodeidah.
3. Limiting the Houthis’ ability to threaten shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, and preventing them from reinforcing their military presence along the western coast.
4. Supporting the position of Yemeni government forces and creating conditions for recovering some of the territory the Houthis have advanced into over recent months.
5. Increasing military pressure on the Houthis to improve Saudi Arabia’s negotiating position and reduce the likelihood of a prolonged war of attrition.
II. Expected Military Actions and Measures
1. Leveraging electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, the Saudi air force, and allied support, coalition forces will sustain airstrikes against missile and drone launch sites, command centers, and storage facilities, with the scope of targeting expanding according to operational outcomes.
2. Intensifying aerial and naval reconnaissance and surveillance to track Houthi movements and supply lines, particularly along the western coast.
3. Possible provision of air and intelligence support to Yemeni government forces to carry out limited ground operations around Mokha, Dhubab, and Taiz, and possibly on the Marib and Jawf fronts.
4. Strengthening Saudi air defenses and protecting economic facilities, ports, and airports in anticipation of Houthi retaliation with missiles and drones.
5. Tightening naval surveillance of arms-smuggling routes and reinforcing navigation protection measures in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.
III. Conclusions
1. The operation represents a continuation of the military escalation of recent weeks, particularly following “Operation Dawn of Yemen,” launched by government forces in October, and recent Saudi strikes against Houthi capabilities – indicating an attempt to regain military initiative and renew pressure on the Houthis, especially since “Operation Dawn of Yemen,” launched under the banner of “Liberating Sanaa,” evolved into “breaking the siege of Taiz” and then “defending Aden.”
2. Recent changes in coalition leadership may reflect a move toward reorganizing military operations, though this is not sufficient to conclude that Saudi Arabia has decided to wage a wide-scale, prolonged war.
3. Saudi Arabia’s ability to achieve its objectives remains tied to the success of airstrikes in weakening Houthi capabilities, and to government forces’ capacity to recover and hold territory. I do not believe air operations alone will be sufficient to achieve a decisive military outcome.
4. The Houthis’ ties to Iran add complexity to the situation, particularly amid the ongoing US-Iran confrontation, and the possibility that the Houthis could leverage threats to navigation in Bab el-Mandeb alongside Iranian threats in the Strait of Hormuz – without this necessarily implying direct coordination across all operations.
5. Saudi Arabia faces the challenge of needing to reduce Houthi threats while avoiding a prolonged war of attrition that could affect its economic security and development projects, particularly as the Houthis retain the ability to continue attacks despite repeated strikes.
IV. Outlook
1. Saudi airstrikes are likely to continue in the near term, with possible expansion in scope if Houthi attacks on Saudi territory continue.
2. I expect Houthi retaliation with missiles and drones against Saudi targets, with threats potentially expanding to include ports, economic facilities, and shipping in the Red Sea.
3. The possibility of renewed ground operations remains, particularly along the western coast and around Mokha and Dhubab, though this will depend on the readiness of government forces and their ability to coordinate with the coalition.
4. Iran may seek to continue supporting the Houthis to preserve their capacity to pressure Saudi Arabia and threaten shipping, though the scale of this support will be affected by the military pressures Tehran itself faces.
5. I expect the military confrontation to continue without a near-term decisive outcome, with the possibility of a return to negotiations if Saudi Arabia succeeds in reducing Houthi threats, or if the cost of operations rises for both sides.
Sayed Ghoneim, PhD
Major General (retired) of the Egyptian Armed Forces
Chairman, Institute for Global Security & Defence Affairs (IGSDA), UAE
www.igsda.org
Sources
Open sources.
Private sources.