Professor, MG(ret) Sayed Ghoneim
PhD in Political Sciences
Chairman, Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA)
News Item 1: Al-Ahram Weekly (English):
The Chiefs of Staff of the Egyptian and Saudi Armed Forces Discuss Military Cooperation.
News Item 2: Reports from Intelligence Websites and sone open-sourse news:
Egypt and Saudi Arabia Signed a Historic Military Agreement, Outlining an Ironclad Alliance, Including Joint Exercises, Covert Operations…, etc.
First: My initial comment:
I believe the headline in Al-Ahram Weekly somewhat downplays the matter, despite the clarification provided in the article itself.
On the other side, I find the reporting style on open-source intelligence websites somewhat exaggerated, as the matter remains within the realm of military cooperation and not a genuine military alliance between Egypt and KSA.
In my opinion, this appears to be a rapprochement between the two countries, confirming their mutual interests in the Red Sea on one hand, and in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia on the other, as follows:
Secondly: Points to consider:
1. It is worth noting that KSA and Egypt signed a cooperation agreement earlier in September 2025 to support maritime security efforts. The agreement includes ongoing operational coordination and the exchange of expertise between the two countries, with cooperation primarily focused on the Red Sea basin. It seems that three countries threatened with fragmentation (Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan), represented by their legitimate governments, will sign this agreement.
2. This previous agreement, without the US, may also include the formation of a joint Egyptian-Saudi naval force to counter threats in the Red Sea. This may reflect the two countries’ desire to avoid openly siding with Western or Israeli actions against the Houthis, especially given their insistence on not participating publicly in the international force against the Houthis in Yemen, Operation Prosperity Guardian. Egypt remembers the disastrous consequences of its intervention in Yemen in the 1960s, and now prefers diplomacy with Yemeni militias to direct combat, especially given KSA’s cessation of direct fighting against the Houthis (mediated by Oman) and its rapprochement with Iran to end the war it led in 2015. Meanwhile, Egypt is attempting to leverage its rapprochement with Tehran—part of a broader regional reconciliation campaign that began with KSA’s normalization of relations with Iran in 2013—to pressure Iran to urge the Houthis to suspend their attacks in the Red Sea.
Third: Conclusions:
So, what do each of Egypt and KSA want?
1. Egypt aims to ensure the security of navigation in the Red Sea, thereby safeguarding the activity of its vital trade artery (the Suez Canal), which has been severely disrupted since the Houthi group escalated its attacks and targeted numerous commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
2. Egypt seeks to counterbalance Ethiopia, which is attempting to shift the balance of power in the Nile Basin and the Red Sea.
3. KSA aims to form a joint naval force to ensure the security of the Red Sea, enabling it to monitor arms smuggling operations to the Houthi group in Yemen, while avoiding a return to direct combat against the Houthis.
4. Monitoring the flow of weapons into Sudan to prevent the escalation of the conflict, as Cairo and Riyadh support Khartoum and the Sudanese army to varying degrees depending on their proximity to Sudan. This support may also extend to the UAE, given the expansion of the Sudanese crisis, particularly in El Fasher on the Egyptian border, where UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces are fighting against the Sudanese government army, which is supported by Egypt and KSA.
5. Abiy Ahmed’s stance on the Nile River, the lifeblood of Egyptian national security, and the Red Sea, a gateway to threats against Egyptian and Saudi national security, is particularly significant. Abiy Ahmed is operating in a highly volatile region for Red Sea security, not only by insisting on a military foothold on the Red Sea that would allow him to intervene in its politics and security, but also by taking steps toward the division of Somalia (the gateway to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa) through his recognition of the self-proclaimed state of “Somaliland”, a position that also appears to be supported by the UAE.
