First Proposition: No official statement, confirmed information, or trusted leak has been issued regarding the timing of a strike against Iran:
It is essential to link the negotiation process between the US and Iran with the US military deployment in the region. There is no doubt that the failure of negotiations increases the likelihood of war, even if war itself is not intended.
However, I have two observations regarding any military analysis that discusses the possibility of a strike against Iran at this phase:
1. The idea of specifying a particular timeframe—whether a specific day or a defined period indicates a strike would occur—based merely on inference rather than a clear statement, confirmed information, or trusted leak (whether days or weeks in advance), is unjustified. There is no clear evidence to support such precision, regardless of whether the probability of a strike is 50%, higher, or lower. Two important factors apply here: First, historically, even at the height of tensions, Washington tends to prolong pressure before resorting to direct strikes, unless a major unforeseen event occurs. Second, this involves US President Donald Trump, whose decisions are difficult to predict; he himself may not know what he will ultimately decide or when he will decide it.
2. The second point concerns Israel. It is not reasonable to downplay the probability of an Israeli action scenario by assigning it low execution probabilities or limited independence in deciding to launch a unilateral strike against Iran. Yes, it is undoubtedly difficult to separate any large-scale Israeli military action from prior coordination considerations with Washington. However, Israel declared in its 2019 National Security Strategy that it would either participate in setting the terms of US–Iran nuclear negotiations or strike Iran—even unilaterally. This position is evident in its statements and current behavior during the crisis.
Based on the above—and considering the scale of forces deployed in the region and their cumulative build-up within a framework of gradual escalation designed to increase pressure on Iran—along with Israel’s pressing desire for the US to carry out a decisive strike against Iran to safeguard its national security, and given Trump’s personality and fluctuating decisions, I believe the probability of the US launching a strike against Iran is high. However, it remains difficult to determine a precise timing or specific timeframe for such a strike without reliable information or a credible leak.
In any case, from a military standpoint, the concept of a decisive US strike on Iran—using modern operational capabilities and likely excluding ground forces—while carrying a high probability, would still require greater force and extremely advanced capabilities. Achieving a decisive victory against Iran would not be a simple matter.
Second Proposition: A statement issued today—Trump: “Either we get a deal, or it will be unfortunate for them… I think that’s enough time—10 or 15 days, at most, roughly.”
My comment:
1. The constant: Trump has (decided) to strike Iran—perhaps a few days before the deadline he mentioned, or a few days after. My assessment is that the earliest possibility could be within the next hours or the next very few days, which would make the publicly stated timeframe part of a deliberate deception plan; the latest could extend to about two weeks, coinciding with the continued cumulative build-up of US forces tasked with carrying out the strike—especially given that the US aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford is likely to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar today February 20, after resupply to enhance readiness, potentially adding approximately four days to the operational timeline. Additionally, reviewing UK of the use of Diego Garcia island to allow the US to use its strategic bombers from it may also factor into the timeline.
2. The exception: That Trump changes his mind for any reason.
Dr. Sayed Ghoneim
