“Egyptian Air Combat Detachment in the UAE”

The Egyptian and Emirati presidents visited the newly deployed Egyptian air formation in Abu Dhabi, which included 13 Egyptian fighter pilots and several Egyptian Rafale multirole fighter jets.

First: Why did Egypt send the combat detachment (Combat Air Task Force) with Rafale fighter jets, and what is its potential impact?

Although the Egyptian Air Force possesses other fighters such as the MiG-29M2, F-16, and Mirage-2000, the specific deployment of the Rafale model at this time can be attributed to the following reasons:

• The Rafale aircraft were likely chosen because they are the newest and most efficient aircraft in the Egyptian Air Force fleet, reducing the likelihood of malfunctions and increasing operational readiness, or for training exercises.
• The French Rafale fighter jets, for which there are likely no French restrictions on their use in training/combat missions in the UAE, including any scenarios related to regional threats, are distinguished by their multi-role capabilities (air-to-air, air-to-ground, reconnaissance, etc.), making them the most suitable for executing diverse missions with greater efficiency compared to older models.
• The compatibility of the Egyptian Rafale fighter jets with the UAE’s Rafale aircraft facilitates joint maneuvers/operations and enhances training/operational coordination between the two sides.
• Relying on them reduces logistical and technical burdens by enabling the utilization of joint technical and armament support with the UAE.
• Egypt’s decision not to deploy MiG-29M2 fighter jets may be due to their limited operational suitability in the UAE theater and possibly Russian considerations related to the conflict environment.
• The presence of 13 Egyptian pilots may indicate that the participating force comprises at least two air formations (with a strength of approximately eight Rafale aircraft).

Second: Preliminary General Conclusions:

1. Egypt’s position is becoming increasingly clear in favor of the Gulf stance against Iranian aggression militarily, while Egypt continues its diplomatic and political maneuvering, whether positioning itself between the UAE and KSA, or between the Gulf and Iran.
2. In my opinion, the main objective of sending the Egyptian air combat Air Task Force to the UAE is to benefit from combat experience in the current operational environment, particularly in countering drones using fighter jets.
3. In the event of Egyptian fighter jets intervening operationally to defend the UAE against Iranian attacks, I expect Israel will not intervene in the fighting against Iran at present. This is taking into account Egypt’s reservations regarding Israel’s perceived excessive superiority in the balance of power and influence at Iran’s expense.
4. There is relative consensus in the Gulf position, perhaps with the exception of Oman, regarding its stance against Iranian aggression. It appears that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have opened their airspace and bases to US forces as part of Operation Freedom of the Strait.
5. Iran will interpret any Western/Arab military reinforcements in the Gulf (even if for training purposes) as part of a broader effort to bolster regional defenses against it. 6. Iran, on the other hand, may escalate cautiously and strategically, both politically and in the media, potentially showcasing its capabilities to resume combat (missiles/drones/threatening maritime navigation) without directly engaging in open confrontation.

Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA)

• Military Section