Recent Geopolitical Developments in the Middle East

• Any future negotiating path between Iran and the United States must guarantee that no military action will be taken against Iran.
• Iran has announced its rejection of negotiations with the West regarding its “defensive capabilities,” with the Iranian Foreign Ministry asserting that its military capabilities are non-negotiable and that there will be no discussions on such matters whatsoever. This stance came after France called for a “comprehensive agreement” with Tehran that would include its missile program and regional influence. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian stated: “Unless a new, strong, lasting, and verifiable agreement is reached by the end of the summer, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom will have no choice but to reimpose the global embargo that was lifted ten years ago.”
• Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will not be permitted access to nuclear facilities; instead, visits will be limited to holding technical and engineering consultations with Iranian officials only, which are likely to take place soon.
• The Iranian Foreign Minister stated that Iran is demanding financial compensation from the United States for damages resulting from American attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. However, such statements are believed to be primarily for media consumption.

This approach aims to pressure Iran through non-military means to return to the negotiating table and reach an agreement regarding both its nuclear program and its ballistic missile program. It is likely that Iran could return to negotiations, but only under the same conditions it had set prior to its recent war against Israel. In this context, Iran seeks to mobilize Gulf, Arab, and East Asian efforts to pressure the United States into showing greater flexibility in negotiations.

These specific demands are not new, as Iran had already raised them prior to the outbreak of the recent war between itself and Israel. However, it is likely that the latest conflict between Israel and Iran has provided greater opportunities for the hardline faction within Iran’s decision-making circles to persist in their rigid stance on the nuclear agreement. This faction tends to oppose reaching any agreement with the United States—a position that contrasts with the reformist current led by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. This situation compels Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to strike a balance between the two currents for the time being. Nonetheless, with the establishment of the Iranian National Defense Council under the chairmanship of President Masoud Pezeshkian—who supports reaching a nuclear agreement—and the appointment of Ali Larijani as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the hardline camp in Iran may no longer hold the majority of decision-making votes within the country’s policymaking structure in the future.

Overall, Iran continues to play the card of ambiguity regarding the fate of its stockpiles of enriched uranium and the centrifuges that survived its recent war with Israel. This is compounded by uncertainty and a lack of clarity in Western intelligence assessments about the actual extent of the damage inflicted on these assets. Consequently, Iran is expected to continue procrastinating for as long as possible over convening negotiations on the nuclear deal, while also maintaining a rigid stance and imposing restrictions on the resumption of its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This remains a pivotal and decisive factor in any potential nuclear agreement between Iran and the Western states in general.

• The recent security challenges faced by the Syrian government.

Summary of Events:

• July 13, 2025: Heavy clashes erupted in al-Suwayda Governorate between local tribes and armed groups, resulting in the deaths of approximately 11 people and the injury of 54 others, accompanied by mass displacement and an escalation in security tensions.
• July 14–15: The Syrian army withdrew from the city amid Israeli airstrikes targeting positions in al-Suwayda following the entry of government forces. Fierce clashes spread to several areas, prompting international calls to halt the escalation.
• Towards a broader and more comprehensive truce (July 21–22): On July 21, a comprehensive agreement was reached under U.S. sponsorship, allowing for the evacuation of civilians wishing to temporarily leave al-Suwayda, with guarantees for their eventual return. The agreement also included prisoner exchanges, the withdrawal of tribal fighters from the city center, and a mutual release of hostages by both sides.
• August 3: Local armed groups were accused of violating the ceasefire, and one internal security officer was killed. The government reportedly regained control over areas such as Tal al-Hadid, according to official sources.
• August 8: A Syrian Red Crescent convoy came under direct fire, though no casualties were reported amid ongoing tensions.

Israeli targeting of Syria:

• July 15–16, 2025: Israel launched multiple airstrikes on sites in the eastern countryside of al-Suwayda and on military areas, including the headquarters of the Syrian General Staff in Damascus, targeting reinforcements of government forces engaged in confrontations with local armed groups.

Gulf investments in Syria:

• Late July 2025: Around 47 investment agreements were signed between Syria and Saudi Arabia, exceeding a total value of $6 billion and spanning multiple sectors.
• August 6, 2025: Damascus hosted a signing ceremony for an additional 12 agreements worth $14 billion, covering major projects such as:
  • Construction of a new airport in Damascus (valued at $4 billion) in cooperation with Qatar.
  • Damascus Metro project worth $2 billion in cooperation with the United Arab Emirates.

Discussion:

Recent developments in Syria strongly indicate a pronounced shift toward the majority of the provisions outlined in the second scenario that we previously identified in our monthly assessment entitled “Changes in the Situation in Syria and the Implications for the United States, Israel, and Iran (Period December 1–30, 2024).”
In that assessment, we noted the following:

Scenario Two – “Continuation of the Sectarian State with Internal Fragmentation” (Scenario with balanced probabilities of occurrence):

• Continued unity of the armed factions under the banner of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham with consolidated leadership and a division of spheres of influence and territories among them.
• Formation of a Syrian army on sectarian and ethnic foundations, while each faction and ethnic group retains its own internal armed groups within its zones of control.
• Election of a Salafi-jihadist government adopting a governance system similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
• Continued presence—whether full or partial—of foreign actors (Turkey, Russia, Iran, the United States) with significant shifts in the balance of influence from one power to another. In this case, Turkish influence would expand at the expense of both Iranian and Russian influence, without their complete disappearance, resulting in Turkey holding the dominant position over Russia and Iran.
• Political stagnation within the country, with the imposition of a continuous state of emergency on the Syrian people, and a prohibition on the emergence of genuine political party activity.
• Efforts to secure any form of international recognition for the new Syrian government, though not as a top priority, while maintaining indirect communication with the international community through a mediator state, potentially Turkey or an Arab/Gulf state (such as Qatar).
• Preservation of the new regime’s internal security and prevention of any attempts at internal fighting among the main armed factions.
• Consultations with the Kurds on border arrangements and the powers granted to them, without ruling out the use of limited and temporary armed engagements as a pressure tool to stimulate negotiations, while avoiding a major armed conflict with them to prevent prolonged or expanded hostilities.
• Failure to achieve an agreement between the new Syrian government and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which could replicate the model of the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.
• Full political alignment of the “new Syria” toward Turkey in the absence of Arab acceptance that would enable it to rebuild the state—potentially replicating the situation of Syria’s alignment with Iran in the early 2000s.

Accordingly, the recent events in As-Suwayda Governorate lead to the following conclusions:

Assessment of the Syrian government’s performance:

• Bias and allegations of violations: The government deployed forces to As-Suwayda; however, multiple reports from different sources indicated that these forces effectively supported the Bedouins in carrying out acts of violence and assaults against the Druze, accompanied by field executions, looting, and abuse of the Druze community as a sectarian and religious symbol.
• Official rhetoric and exploitation of sectarianism: The interim Prime Minister, Al-Shar’a, sought to present himself as a protector and mediator between the parties, attributing blame to external interference and unsettled tribes, using nationalistic rhetoric calling for unity. At the same time, there was external backing for certain Druze leaders.
• Conditional implementation and ambiguity: Despite the existence of official documents regarding the agreement, differences in the positions of local leaders (such as Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri) obstructed the implementation of certain clauses, leading to the recurrence of incidents. This reflects weak linkage between the central authority and local influence in the governorate.
• Subsequent move toward de-escalation: Ultimately, following U.S. and international pressure, the government reached a workable agreement prioritizing calm and facilitating the evacuation of civilians, paving the way for the delivery of expanded humanitarian aid. While positive, this step came only after significant losses and a collapse of trust.

Role of Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze communities:

• Bedouin tribes: The spark began with the kidnapping of a Druze merchant, later escalating into a broad retaliatory campaign. Bedouins from other areas arrived in support of the local Bedouin population in As-Suwayda, with some committing widespread acts of violence against the Druze.
• Druze communities: They were divided between those who accepted the truce agreement (e.g., Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou’) and those who rejected it (e.g., Hikmat al-Hijri), leading to internal fragmentation that disrupted local humanitarian arrangements. Groups that accepted the truce supported the removal of Bedouins from residential areas and adopted a role of community self-protection.

Israeli intervention:
Israel carried out airstrikes on government targets in Damascus and deep within As-Suwayda in defense of the Druze, considering the government’s cooperation with the Bedouins a threat to the security of the southern front. Israel also demanded the establishment of a demilitarized zone in southern Syria.

U.S. position:
While supporting the truce and negotiations, Washington expressed disapproval of uncoordinated Israeli strikes, emphasizing that the Syrian government must be held accountable for domestic violations.

Syrian–Israeli negotiations under U.S. sponsorship:
Following the escalation, talks were held in Paris bringing together Syrian and Israeli officials under American mediation. Damascus affirmed that Syrian sovereignty and non-sectarian governance were non-negotiable, rejecting any separatist or partitionist demands put forward by the Druze, and called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from advanced positions in southern Syria.
The talks did not yield a final agreement, but both parties agreed to continue dialogue aimed at stabilizing security and establishing direct communication channels under a U.S.-mediated framework.

Overall, the recent events in Syria could affect the United States’ willingness to lift American sanctions on the Syrian economy, especially in light of the severe violations committed by Syrian government security forces in the Syrian coast and in As-Suwayda Governorate, amid speculation about the potential lack of central control by the Syrian government over certain armed factions integrated into its security apparatus.

Syrian–U.S. Relations:
In consultation with the Attorney General and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, the designation of Jabhat al-Nusra—also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (and other aliases)—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization was officially revoked on the 7th of July.

This U.S. move serves the Syrian government in the following ways:

• It is conceivable that lifting the terrorist designation from Jabhat al-Nusra would consequently lift the ban on its then-leader, Ahmad al-Joulani, as well as on the organization’s leadership (subject to confirmation). This appears to be part of a broader settlement between the United States and the new Syrian government.
• It is also conceivable that the sanctions imposed on the financial transactions and bank accounts of the organization and its members would be lifted. This seems to be part of the U.S.–Syrian deal, particularly given the new Syrian government’s urgent need for funding. At the very least, it would grant formal legitimacy to such funding and all activities related to it.

The United States hopes this step will prompt the Syrian leadership to accelerate the confidential negotiations with Israel to reach preliminary agreements that could establish lasting peace in the region—serving both U.S. and Israeli interests, especially the political visions of Trump and Netanyahu, along with their domestic popularity.

Activities of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Syria and Turkey:
There have been no notable developments regarding Uyghur fighters in Syria and Turkey. Some of them have been granted military ranks and positions within the Syrian security forces, with the Syrian government so far refraining from imposing any form of restrictions on them.

The U.S. removal of Jabhat al-Nusra from the list of terrorist organizations poses a security challenge to China, which remains concerned about the involvement of foreign fighters from the Uyghur community within the ranks of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. China continues to view this with suspicion, particularly in cases where some of these fighters might wish—or be compelled—to return to China.

Multiple sources indicate that Turkey has facilitated the movement of Uyghur fighters into Syria to fight alongside various jihadist groups. However, Turkey remains cautious regarding these groups, particularly in preventing any infiltration attempts into its strategic depth. Turkey has previously arrested several Uyghur fighters on charges related to espionage or smuggling. Nevertheless, there is no tangible indication that Turkey is taking a firm overall stance against Uyghur fighters.

Syrian–Gulf Relations:

President Ahmad al-Sharʿ is currently attempting to balance Syria’s relations with the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—while avoiding reliance on a single party in several key matters, foremost among them economic funding for reconstruction and political support at both the regional and international levels.

The Syrian government is working toward the following objectives:

• Ensuring the balance of its political and economic relations with the Gulf states.
• Seeking to demonstrate that Gulf governments maintain confidence in the Syrian leadership at a time when there is growing, though unspoken, concern from Europe and the United States over recent events in Syria’s al-Suwayda Governorate. These developments come amid ongoing internal fighting among various Syrian ethnic factions in several provinces and violations by Syrian regime forces that could be classified as war crimes. Such incidents may ultimately prevent the permanent lifting of U.S. sanctions on the Syrian economy.

In general, the Gulf states are currently working to fill the vacuum in influence left by Iran in Syria through their political and economic instruments—a point of convergence among them. However, there remains a latent competition between them over shares of political and security influence as well as economic and commercial contracts in Syria, as follows:

Qatar:
Qatar seeks to maintain deeply rooted relations and influence over the Syrian government, particularly over Islamist armed groups that have since been integrated into the current Syrian security forces. This reflects a clear strategy that Qatar continues to pursue—acting as a mediator between such jihadist groups and Western states should the situation deteriorate in the future.

Saudi Arabia:

• To gain influence over Syria’s political leadership by leveraging its economic and diplomatic surplus to fill the gap left by Iran and remove what remains of Iranian influence inside Syria.
• To promote Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic role by showcasing its capacity to persuade European and Western states to lift sanctions and to maintain recognition of Ahmad al-Sharʿ’s government as the principal and legitimate representative of Syria.
• To compete primarily with Qatar and secondarily with the UAE.
• To rival Turkey politically in possessing tools of influence over the current Syrian government, even if this requires Saudi Arabia to employ hard-power tools or adopt a relatively confrontational approach in its competition with Turkey inside Syria.
• To seek influence over Syrian decision-making circles regarding any prospective agreements between Syria and Israel—particularly normalization agreements—in order to counter the UAE’s regional efforts in this domain.

United Arab Emirates:

The United Arab Emirates serves as an important channel for President Ahmad al-Sharʿ to engage indirectly with the Israeli government in order to formulate any prospective agreements that the UAE may sponsor, either directly or indirectly. It is in the interest of both the UAE and Israel for the current Syrian government to reach a preliminary agreement with Israel to avert any future confrontations.

The UAE seeks to:

• Approach the Syrian government cautiously, ensuring that neither Saudi Arabia nor Qatar gains a head start over the UAE in dividing Gulf influence over the current Syrian administration.
• Secure economic privileges within the Syrian economy, particularly in the operation of air and sea ports.
• Compete with Qatar—a role perceived as more concerning to the UAE than that of Saudi Arabia in Syria—due to its persistent apprehension over the presence of jihadist Islamist groups in Syria, whether embedded within official security structures or operating outside them.
• Obtain security assurances from the Syrian government that Syria will not export terrorism, while ensuring that public discourse within Syria refrains from criticizing any Gulf state, particularly the UAE.
• Expedite, as much as possible, the process of reaching an agreement with Israel in a manner that enhances the UAE’s image with the United States, portraying it as the chief architect of the Abraham Accords in the Middle East.

• The Gaza Strip crisis in light of recent developments.

Summary of Events:

• Failure of Negotiations – Late July 2025:
  On 25 July 2025, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff announced the “failure of negotiations” held in Doha between Israel and Hamas, prompting both parties to exchange accusations over responsibility for the breakdown of talks. On the same day, Netanyahu stated that Israel was considering “alternative options,” including ending Hamas’ rule in Gaza, in the aftermath of this failure.
• Post-Negotiation Breakdown – Early August 2025:
  On 4 August 2025, a report indicated that the discussions had focused on the lists of hostages and prisoners, but the main stumbling block was the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and guarantees for ending the war. This reflected the complexity of the situation following the collapse of negotiations.
• Israeli Cabinet Decision – 8 August 2025:
  On 8 August 2025, the Israeli Security–Political Cabinet (the “cabinet”) approved a plan to impose full military control over the Gaza Strip and to “reoccupy” Gaza entirely, with directives to begin establishing control on the ground, evacuating civilians, and distributing humanitarian aid outside combat zones.

The plan included five specific principles:

1. Disarming Hamas.
2. Recovering all abductees (alive or dead).
3. Disarming Gaza as a whole.
4. Imposing complete security control.
5. Establishing a civilian administration unaffiliated with Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.

Discussion:
Netanyahu continues to entangle the political and military situation of the Gaza crisis in a manner that shows no clear end thus far. Negotiations for a ceasefire and the release of part of the Israeli hostages and prisoners in exchange for a halt to hostilities and a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip have failed.

To date, there is no clear vision as to how the Israeli army will implement Netanyahu’s plans to reoccupy the Gaza Strip, displace Palestinians into designated camps, and simultaneously conduct operational missions, which are expected to intensify both in scope and scale in the coming period.

Netanyahu faces extensive criticism from the Israeli opposition, the Israeli public, and even the Israeli military itself over his plans for Gaza, for the following reasons:

Reasons for the Israeli Army’s Rejection:
The likely reasons behind the Israeli army’s rejection of Netanyahu’s plans revolve around the following:

• The psychological and physical exhaustion suffered by members of the Israeli army, given that they have been in an almost constant state of general mobilization for nearly two years. This could lead to a decline in operational efficiency, potentially resulting in human losses.
• The necessity for the Israeli army to mobilize approximately 200,000 reservists to execute Netanyahu’s military plans, at a time when Israeli society is witnessing divisions between the Haredim, who reject conscription, and other segments of the Israeli population who oppose bearing the bulk of the military burden.
• The need for Israeli forces to engage more extensively in urban warfare tactics, which would significantly increase the operational burden of their missions and raise the likelihood of casualties.
• The absence of a clear plan regarding the length of time the Israeli army will remain inside the Gaza Strip, which heightens uncertainty for Israeli military planners and places them under severe operational pressure.
• The lack of logistical capacity for the Israeli army to evacuate Palestinian cities and camps and relocate their inhabitants to Israeli-administered shelters.
• Increased contact between the Israeli army and the residents of Gaza, which could lead to more incidents that might be classified as war crimes, thereby intensifying international tensions and exposing Israeli soldiers and officers to international legal accountability.
• The possibility of other fronts igniting, either partially or fully, whether individually or collectively, which could increase the risk of security breaches in Israel’s strategic depth.

Netanyahu’s Motivations for These Plans:

• An attempt to satisfy the Israeli far-right in order to maintain the current ruling coalition and avoid the Israeli government being pushed toward holding early elections before the scheduled date in October 2026.
• An effort to “push forward” by launching an unconventional military operation after having exhausted other options, particularly those centered on reaching a deal with Hamas.
• A strategy to entangle the Israeli General Staff in burdensome operational missions, keeping them occupied with military tasks and discouraging public criticism of the Israeli Security Cabinet’s policies.
• A bid to project the image that he is in full control and that no internal Israeli faction or international actor can impose any form of enforced truce upon him if it conflicts with his political plans.

• The Houthi–Israeli conflict.

Summary of Events:

• July 6: The Houthis resumed their attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned cargo ship Magic Sea was attacked southwest of Al-Hudaydah, sustaining damage.
• July 7: The Israeli Air Force launched a new strike targeting Houthi positions in Yemen. According to preliminary reports, the strikes hit the ports of Al-Hudaydah, Ras Isa, and Al-Salif, the hijacked vessel Galaxy Leader, and the Ras Kanatb power plant. In retaliation, the Houthis fired ballistic missiles and drones towards Israel; it is believed that one missile penetrated Israeli air defenses and struck the West Bank.
• July 18: Israeli defense forces intercepted a missile launched by the Houthis from Yemen towards Ben Gurion Airport in Israel, using the Arrow-3 missile defense system.
• July 21: Israel carried out airstrikes on the Houthi-controlled port of Al-Hudaydah for the second time in a month. According to Israeli officials, the latest operation marked the first use of drones instead of fighter jets, targeting military infrastructure in the port.
• July 22: Israeli forces announced they had intercepted a missile launched by the Houthis. The missile, named Palestine 2, was a hypersonic ballistic weapon aimed at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv.
• July 25: Reports indicated that the Greek government would deploy a rescue vessel in the Red Sea to assist in maritime incidents and protect seafarers and global shipping, following Houthi attacks earlier in the month on two Liberian-flagged cargo ships operated by Greece — Magic Seas and Eternity Sea.
• July 27: The Houthis declared they would target any vessel belonging to companies dealing with Israeli ports, regardless of nationality.

Discussion:
The situation in the Red Sea remains unstable, with a rising likelihood of attacks after several months of relative calm without direct targeting of commercial vessels. Israel has focused on striking vital infrastructure, thereby hitting the Houthis’ key financial lifelines. Continued reciprocal attacks are likely as long as no permanent ceasefire is reached in Gaza.

The renewed targeting of maritime navigation by the Houthis demonstrates the following:

• The Houthis’ desire to reap populist gains by promoting themselves as the faction resisting the United States and Israel.
• Such operations further embarrass the United States, given that the ceasefire agreement between it and the Houthis stipulated a halt to attacks on maritime navigation — a commitment the Houthi movement only adhered to temporarily.

The resumption of Houthi attacks on maritime navigation may serve Iranian objectives by:

• Showcasing Iran’s ability to exert influence in the Middle East even after its recent war with Israel.
• Pressuring the United States and European countries to refrain from escalating confrontations with Israel once again.
• Preoccupying Israeli air defenses and accelerating the depletion of its stockpile of interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense systems, in anticipation of a possible resumption of military hostilities between Iran and Israel.

It is also possible that the Houthis have managed to detain some crew members from the ships they have sunk, intending to negotiate their release at a later stage.

An escalation of tensions in the Red Sea could prompt the United States to consider launching another temporary military campaign against Houthi strongholds, albeit with less intensity in terms of firepower and a more limited operational timeline.