The Israeli Strike Against Hamas Leaders In Qatar: A Deeper Look At The Circumstances

1. I will begin first with the potential objectives of the Israeli strike:

• Demonstrating Israel’s practical denial of Netanyahu’s ties to Qatar (Qatar Gate), explicitly pushing Qatar from the position of partner/collaborator to that of adversary.
• A firm step to remove Qatar from its mediation role, as Israel considers it a supporter of Hamas and has not met any of Israel’s demands through its mediation.
• Convincing Qatar, and even the Gulf states, that their deep ties with Western countries, especially the United States, will not be a substitute for engaging in direct peace with Israel.
• Emphasizing Israel’s seriousness in pursuing Hamas leaders (which it, along with the West and the UAE, have designated as terrorist organizations), which is one of the rules of engagement that Israel has repeatedly declared and implemented, both now and in the past.
• Expressing frustration with the Qatari Al Jazeera channel, which has served as an influential media arm and spokesperson for Hamas.

2. Israel Launched an Attack on Hamas Leadership in Doha:

On 9 September 2025, Israel carried out an airstrike targeting Hamas leaders residing in the Qatari capital, Doha, marking an unprecedented escalation extending into the Gulf region. The strike reportedly hit senior figures, including Khalil al-Hayya, a key negotiator in Gaza ceasefire talks, along with several other leaders of the movement. The full extent of the damage remains unknown.

The headquarters of the Hamas political leadership meeting, which was targeted on September 9, 2025

This strike marked the first direct Israeli strike on Hamas inside Qatar, a key mediator in the war between Israel and Hamas. It targeted senior Hamas figures, including Khalil al-Hayya (a senior Hamas leader and head of its political bureau and negotiating team in Gaza), and others. It coincided with a reported meeting of some of these leaders to discuss a US proposal for a ceasefire or prisoner exchange. According to available reports, at least five Hamas members were killed, including Khalil al-Hayya’s son and his aide. A Qatari security officer was also killed. However, senior Hamas leaders reportedly survived, and Hamas claimed that the senior leadership was not killed. The operation was described as coming after recent attacks (including a shooting at the Ramot Junction) and perceived threats from Hamas. Israel reportedly notified the United States shortly before the operation, but US officials say they were not involved in its planning or approval. While Israel claims it targeted them, Hamas says they are alive. There has been no independent verification to date.

Reports indicated that the original plan was to be implemented by Mossad through its agents and operatives on the ground. However, Mossad advised against it due to the lack of time and the fear that Gulf states close to Israel, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, would consider the operation a violation that would undo all the progress achieved with these two countries in particular, as well as sever the last link with Qatar.

The operation faced severe Arab and international reactions, and an emergency session of the Security Council was held, resulting in a condemnation of the operation without mentioning Israel by name. There is some concern that the attack could undermine the ongoing ceasefire or prisoner negotiations.

3. Israeli Flight Path for Conducting the Strikes:

• First Route: Northern Israel → Syria → Iraq → the Persian Gulf, with munitions released from international waters. The mission would be secured by electronic warfare measures, air cover from fighter escorts, and aerial refueling. (This is the most likely route, as it is geographically shorter and traverses’ countries such as Syria and Iraq, which possess limited air-defense capabilities).
• Second Route: Southern Israel → the Red Sea → Bab el-Mandeb Strait → Arabian Sea → Strait of Hormuz → the Persian Gulf, with electronic warfare measures, fighter escorts, and electronic warfare aircraft providing cover. (This is less likely due to its geographic length and the requirement to fly near Gulf states along the Strait of Hormuz that possess more advanced air-defense capabilities).

4. The Israeli Air Force’s targeting of Hamas officials in Doha indicates the following:

• A significant intelligence penetration of Hamas’s leadership within Qatar.
• The strike appears to be largely symbolic: video footage from the vicinity of the building shows the use of two guided bombs, each estimated at 225 pounds, rather than high-yield munitions capable of destroying the entire meeting site—suggesting that eliminating all attendees may not have been the principal objective.
• A concrete implementation of Israel’s earlier declaration that it would target all Palestinian resistance leaders, whom it designates as terrorist commanders.
• The situation is further complicated by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s approval of an assassination operation against Hamas’s political bureau members on Qatari soil, executed via Israeli airpower. This represents a dangerous escalation, which can be analyzed as follows:
• Israeli Motives and Objectives:
• To demonstrate boldness and the ability to conduct highly complex operations both militarily and in terms of intelligence, while also projecting sufficient political clout to withstand the consequences of such actions.
• To signal operational independence from the U.S.; it is believed that Israel informed Washington only shortly before the strike, thereby placing the U.S. in a dilemma—similar to Israel’s 2024 strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus.
• To pressure Hamas’s political wing by conveying that no sanctuary exists abroad, thereby coercing them into accepting Israel’s final terms in negotiations.
• To buy time by complicating negotiations, thus forcing the Israeli military to maintain its operations in Gaza.
• To compel Qatar to suspend its mediation role in the talks, thereby derailing negotiations and rendering their resumption uncertain.
• To push Qatar toward expelling Palestinian political bureau representatives; in such a case, Turkey is the most likely alternative host, more so than Iran.
• The Qatari Position:
• Domestic embarrassment among the Qatari public, who assumed U.S. protection would shield the country.
• Political embarrassment for Qatar’s leadership, particularly Emir Tamim and the ruling family as a whole.
• A potential fracture in one of the pillars of Qatar’s foreign policy strategy, which has long relied on serving as a mediator between Western states and jihadist or militant Islamist groups based in Doha—such as its prior mediation with the Taliban and Hamas. The Israeli strike therefore risks undermining the trust Qatar has built with such groups, consequently weakening its strategic value to the United States.
• The U.S. Position:

Whether the United States (particularly the Trump administration) was complicit from the outset or learned of the operation only belatedly, its credibility and interests with the Gulf states have been damaged in an unprecedented manner. This development underscores to them that the expansion of Israel’s regional influence may be prioritized above the security of the Gulf states themselves. Such a perception harms American influence in the medium and long term, as it may push the Gulf states to broaden their cooperation with other international powers, such as China and Russia, in new domains—including expanded military collaboration.

5. Expected Implications of the Israeli Airstrike in Doha on the Palestinian Resistance Abroad:

• Erosion of confidence among religiously oriented resistance factions (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) in their core ideological allies—Iran, Qatar, and Turkey—given their inability to ensure the safety of resistance leaders while hosting them. This may in turn reinvigorate other Palestinian resistance factions with different ideological orientations, encouraging them to expand their role in the Palestinian cause abroad. It could also compel Hamas and Islamic Jihad to reframe their ideologies in order to align with new, more reliable potential backers.
• Diminished resilience of the main resistance factions, both internally and externally—militarily and politically—against Israel’s devastating strikes. These strikes not only degrade their capabilities but also jeopardize the very survival of Palestinians in Gaza today, with similar risks expected soon for the population of the West Bank.
• A potential surge in recruitment efforts by existing terrorist organizations (ISIS and al-Qaeda) targeting the most hardline Palestinian resistance members. In the near future, this could even lead to splintering within Hamas and Islamic Jihad, giving rise to new, more radical factions that might nonetheless remain unwilling to align themselves formally with ISIS or al-Qaeda.

Regarding Hamas’s Response to the Assassination Attempt on Its Political Bureau Leaders in Gaza, several scenarios—or combinations thereof—may unfold:

If Netanyahu Remains in Power and Coordination Persists Between Hamas’s Political Bureau and Its Military Leadership in Gaza:

• Most Likely Scenario (Scenario 1):
• Relocation of Hamas’s political bureau leaders to another country, with Turkey being the most probable destination—more likely than Iran, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia.
• The political bureau delegates to Hamas’s military wing in Gaza the authority to grant or reject final approval of any forthcoming proposals.
• Continuation of fighting in Gaza at the same military tempo, adhering to Hamas’s existing tactical patterns, alongside a temporary suspension of negotiations.
• Face-saving escalation through the launch of multiple rockets from Gaza, despite Hamas leadership’s awareness that these will likely be intercepted.
• Release of video footage depicting dead hostages, whether civilian or military, to inflame Israeli public opinion and provoke mass protests against Netanyahu.
• Deployment of “lone wolf” operatives through the recruitment of Palestinian citizens of Israel or the activation of sleeper cells to target Israeli civilians and soldiers within Israel proper.
• Temporary suspension of negotiations until mediation is sought from another power, most likely Russia or China.
• Moderately Probable Scenario (Scenario 2):
• Relocation of Hamas’s political bureau leaders to an unspecified non-Arab Islamic country.
• Release of video footage showing the killing of hostages (civilian or military) to fuel unrest in Israeli society against Netanyahu.
• Delegation of decision-making authority to the military wing in Gaza for final approval or rejection of future proposals.
• Temporary suspension of negotiations until mediation is pursued, most likely with Russia or China.
• Least Likely Scenario (Scenario 3):
• Relocation of Hamas’s political bureau leaders to countries with established jihadist sanctuaries, such as Pakistan or Afghanistan—arguably the most dangerous development in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict if it were to occur.
• Execution of hostages and concealment of their bodies either within Gaza or at sea along Gaza’s coast.
• Adoption of widespread suicide attacks against Israeli forces in Gaza, leveraging the enlistment of numerous Gazan civilians who have lost family members to Israeli bombardments. This would likely accelerate the collapse of Hamas’s military presence in Gaza.

If Netanyahu Remains in Power but No Coordination Exists Between Hamas’s Political Bureau and Its Military Leadership in Gaza:

This represents the gravest scenario, as it would generate severe uncertainty and unpredictability within Hamas’s leadership structure, potentially resulting in the following:

• Near-total loss of communication channels with Hamas in the present period.
• Torture, execution, or mutilation of hostages and prisoners.
• A resort to suicide operations targeting Israeli forces within Gaza.

6. Hypotheses are emerging regarding the repercussions of the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar:

• Will Netanyahu fulfil his threat promise against Hamas leaders everywhere including Gulf states and others like Egypt and Turkey?

Undoubtedly, targeting Hamas leaders has become a phase imposed by Israel on Hamas in Qatar and probably in Turkey, but not likely in Egypt, this is due to:

• Israel considers both of Qatar with its TV channel Aljazeerah which is consiered a spokesperson of Hamas, and Turkey led by Erdogan, the God father of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, Israel considers both of them supporters and sponsors of Hamas.
• Hamas’s continued procrastination, keeping the Israeli hostages, despite Hamas’s acceptance of the latest conditions as they stand., with the mediators’ inability to pressure Hamas to accept the latest US conditions until recently.
• Israel’s success in targeting several Hamas supporters and the Iranian prxies may have forced Trump to approve the Israeli escalation.
• There is no doubt that Netanyahu will fulfil his threat, as it will directly pressure Hamas to accept any conditions, and on the other hand, indirect pressure on the mediators to conclude any current or future deal.
• How do you see the future of the settlement?

The settlement is heading toward complexity, as Hamas will not easily respond to Israeli threats with American support. The current option is to continue with the Egyptian mediator, who is likely more desired by Israel, as Tel Aviva considers Egypt more flexible and experienced in dealing with Hamas in favor or Israel and more assertive toward Hamas. The clearest evidence is Egypt’s request that Hamas leaders currently in Egypt remain in Cairo. This means that Cairo is eager for a decisive round of negotiations.

• What are Doha’s options?
• The Qatari mediator will not withdraw easily from the negotiations, but will try to put pressure on the US taking the insult and the direct threat by Israel as it’s towards all GCC countries and towards all Arab and Islamic states, which has embarrassed the Qatari and all GCC leaders, exploiting the normalization card of pressure in the hand of UAE and the desired normalization with KSA.
• During the Arab/Islamic summit, Qatar will work to issue a resolution collectively condemning Israel and threatening to pursue it internationally. It will also promote the two-state solution and mobilize greater support for a Palestinian state, based on the logic of counter-pressure on Israel.
• What The GCC Expected Reactions?

It is anticipated that the Gulf states in general, and Qatar in particular, will attempt to pressure Trump through economic contracts and financial pledges made during his recent visit to the Gulf. The objective will be to compel Israel to refrain from any further violations of the sovereignty of Qatar or other Gulf states, whether through military means—as occurred with Qatar—or through intelligence operations such as sabotage and assassinations.

With respect to the Abraham Accords, the likelihood of their suspension for an extended period is increasing, so long as no concrete steps are taken by any future Israeli government toward resolving the Palestinian issue.

7. A more in-depth look at the Israeli-Qatari position from my perspective.

We’ve previously stated in more than one place that Israel has had a fundamental decision for decades to completely undermine the Palestinian cause and to discredit the idea that the cause of instability in the Middle East is Iran, which is pushing its proxies to impose its influence in the region through the countries surrounding Israel on land and sea, rather than Israel’s undermining of the Palestinian cause. This prompted Netanyahu to exploit the Trump administration to accelerate the implementation of the following:

• Netanyahu accelerated the implementation of “annexation” measures in the West Bank, by annexing Palestinian lands to Israeli settlements.
• Netanyahu began by dividing the Middle East ideologically into four sects, one with which he had signed peace agreements, such as the Gulf States, Egypt and Jordan, which is the Sunni Arabs, and three other sects that were considered a threat: (Iranian Shiism, sponsored by the mullahs’ regime – the Muslim Brotherhood, sponsored by Erdogan and Qatar – and Salafi jihadism, partially sponsored by Qatar, meaning the Al-Nusra Front and other organizations). Taking into account that Netanyahu had provided treatment to Al-Nusra Front casualties during their war against the Syrian army during the Assad era.

The Trump administration also witnessed the Gulf rift and the quartet’s decision to boycott Qatar. During this period, the boycotting countries’ classic view of Qatar became apparent, a view Israel exploited in its interactions with Qatar, which ranged between hostility and accommodation. This classic view can be considered the general rule regarding Qatar, not the exception. This coincided with two events in the Middle East that profoundly impacted the region and prompted Israel to expedite the implementation of all necessary measures for two related decisions:

• The Arab Spring revolutions, which prompted the acceleration of the normalization decision (the Abraham Accords with Arab and Islamic countries).
• The nuclear agreement with Iran, which prompted the decision to strike Iran and overthrow the mullahs’ regime, despite the Iranian Supreme Leader’s fatwa prohibiting Iran from possessing nuclear weapons.

This was followed by a momentous event: Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa, carried out by Palestinian factions in Gaza, led by Hamas, against Israel on October 7, 2023. Qatar’s role in supporting Hamas’s position against Israel was even more evident, particularly through Al Jazeera, despite Qatar’s negotiating position. Qatar’s stance toward Hezbollah or the Houthis in particular was not the same as its stance toward Hamas and the Qassam Brigades. Qatar made Al Jazeera an official spokesperson for Hamas (as I mentioned in previous visions), positioning Qatar as an enemy of Israel, far from compromise.

This led the Netanyahu government to invade Qatari territory to strike Hamas leaders on September 9, 2023. Trump, Netanyahu’s friend, returned to the US presidency to support Netanyahu’s war decisions and continued the annexation process during the Trump administration. This contrasts with the classic period of Qatar’s relationship with the rule, which existed prior to October 7, 2023, and which transformed us into an exception. This will push Qatar toward greater and more rapid rapprochement with the Gulf and Arab states, especially the former boycotting states.

Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA):

• Middle East and North Africa Board.
• Associate Researchers’ Board,

Sayed Ghoneim, PhD

Major General (retired) of the Egyptian Armed Forces

Chairman, Institute for Global Security & Defence Affairs (IGSDA), UAE

www.igsda.org

Sources:

• Open sources.
• Private sources.