1. Continued US strikes against Iran: Following Trump’s announcement that Iran had shot down two US Apache helicopters over the Strait of Hormuz, US Central Command launched strikes on June 9 and the night of June 10/11, 2026.
New US strikes against Iranian targets on the night of June 10/11, 2026:
* The latest strike was a Suppression of Air Defenses and Communications Networks (SEAD/DEAD) operation, targeting mostly facilities related to the security of the Strait.
* Military objective: To reduce Iran’s ability to monitor its airspace and territorial waters and to prepare the ground for any subsequent US operations should the crisis continue.
Based on official US data published up to the morning of June 11, 2026, and what could be verified from open sources, the picture is still incomplete, but it can be summarized as follows:
* Target Locations: (US Central Command did not release a detailed list of targets or coordinates, stating only that the strikes targeted military sites inside Iran. Indications from Iranian and international media are as follows:
o Areas on Qeshm Island – Minab – Sirik – the vicinity of Bandar Abbas.
o Reports also mentioned explosions near the port of Jask.
o Trump indicated that one of the targets was about 40 miles from Tehran.)
* Targets Struck:
o Military surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
o Iranian military communications systems.
o Air defense systems and their locations.
o Military radars and coastal early warning and surveillance facilities.
o Some unofficial reports suggest the possibility of targeting command and control centers associated with drones, military communications hubs, and field command networks.
* Weapons and Methods Used:
49 Tomahawk BGM-109 cruise missiles Tomahawk missiles were launched from the sea. The US destroyer USS Michael Murphy (DDG-112) participated in the launch, and official footage was released.
US fighter jets carried out additional airstrikes against targets inside Iran.
US forces used precision-guided munitions launched from assets belonging to the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
2. Israel’s Position:
– Netanyahu affirmed that Israel would continue to act decisively against Iran and its proxies, considering them a threat to regional and international stability. Israeli political and security circles welcomed the direct US military involvement against Iran, viewing it as a deterrent and evidence of Washington’s willingness to use force to protect its interests and forces in the region. Close political, military, and intelligence coordination between the two sides continued regarding developments in the crisis and potential Iranian reactions.
– Israel raised its military and defense alert level on all fronts and strengthened the readiness of its multi-layered air defense systems. This was accompanied by intensified reconnaissance and intelligence gathering operations to monitor Iranian movements and assess the results of the recent US and Israeli strikes. Israeli security assessments indicate that targeting Iranian air defense and surveillance networks could facilitate further airstrikes against targets inside Iran should the escalation continue.
– Israeli sources reported that the Air Force used Blue Sparrow air-launched ballistic missiles in strikes targeting sites inside Iran. These missiles were launched by F-15 fighter jets from outside Iranian airspace and are believed to have crossed Iraqi airspace at high altitudes before striking their targets deep inside Iran.
– Israeli military censorship permitted the release of information regarding a piece of debris resulting from an interception operation that landed inside the Ramat David Airbase during the recent Iranian attack. The censor clarified that the incident occurred in a non-operational area within the base and resulted in no casualties or significant operational or military damage.
3. Iran’s Position:
– Iran launched a missile attack on Kuwait and Bahrain.
– Pezeshkian: The threat to target infrastructure is not a show of force but rather a sign of desperation.
– The Foreign Ministry accused Washington of orchestrating an attack on Kuwait Airport to create a pretext for marketing anti-drone air defense systems.
– The Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that the armed forces had launched strikes against US bases and facilities. In the region, all countries are reminded of their responsibilities to prevent the US military from using their territories against Tehran.
– The Revolutionary Guard: We destroyed 21 targets at US air and naval bases in the region. We destroyed four targets, including F-35 aircraft hangars at the Azraq/Muwaffaq Salti base in Jordan, using missiles.
– A US MQ-9 drone was shot down over Jam County in Bushehr Province.
– Iran’s Permanent Mission to Vienna describes the IAEA resolution as “political” and “unprofessional.” (The IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution requiring Iran to declare its remaining uranium stockpile. The resolution emphasizes the need to grant the IAEA “all the necessary authority” to verify Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.)
4. Conclusions and Expectations:
First, it may be important to clarify the following equation from my perspective:
Trump knows that the US possesses significant capabilities compared to Iran. However, his political will to continue the war is less than that capability, as evidenced by his threatening statements about force and promises of victory (based on the US capabilities). Yet, he doesn’t implement several of these threats on a large scale on the ground, making his statements appear false. While the impact of the strikes is severe and militarily painful for Iran, it ultimately fails to achieve the desired strategic victory due to Iran’s insistence on continuing to endure the consequences of these strikes.
This comes at a time when Iran lacks capabilities of all aspects, but possesses a clear will to maintain the regime survival (strong), even if it means accepting the continuation of the war. However, it is betting on Trump’s will, not on the US capabilities. Therefore, we see Iran issuing threats and carrying out actions, but the impact of these actions is almost negligible. Nevertheless, it achieves what it may be so called a (media victory) that is intangible by the standards of true victory.
Therefore, the current conflict is governed more by a dynamic of will than by a dynamic of capability. The US possesses significant military superiority, but its ability to translate this superiority into a protracted or all-out war remains constrained by political and strategic considerations. Iran is betting that the cost of escalation and its continuation will influence the US political decisions more than it is betting on its ability to achieve direct military parity with the US. Conversely, Trump is betting that the vast gap in military and economic capabilities will ultimately compel Iran to make concessions or accept a settlement on terms more favorable to Washington.
The convergence between Iran’s limited capabilities and the US will to avoid expanding the war indicates that both sides are seeking to manage the escalation rather than slide into a full-blown conflict. The US carries out limited, painful strikes, while Iran continues to retaliate to demonstrate its capacity for resistance and maintain its image of deterrence. If this dynamic persists, the pattern of limited, tit-for-tat strikes and political pressure will likely continue until one side concludes that the cost of continuation has become greater than the cost of negotiation. However, total war still may exist in case of any mistake.
Accordingly, I see the following:
Conclusions:
* The US is certain it can operate on three tracks (sanctions, negotiations, and war).
* The US Central Command aims to systematically suppress Iranian military capabilities, with a clear focus on surveillance, command, and air defense networks related to the security of the Strait of Hormuz.
* The US and Israel are working within a framework of close operational and (increasingly close intelligence) coordination aimed at increasing military pressure on Iran while maintaining freedom of air and naval operations in the region, despite leaks suggesting division and mistrust between them.
* Iran still possesses offensive capabilities that allow it to respond regionally by targeting US bases and interests, but it faces increasing military and diplomatic pressure, particularly regarding the nuclear issue.
* The expanding series of maritime incidents and attacks on ships in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea increases the risk of disruption to international navigation and prompts regional and international actors to exert pressure to contain the escalation.
* There are no conclusive indications yet that any of the parties are heading towards a full-scale war, but all parties are seeking to improve their negotiating position through controlled military escalation.
Expectations:
* The US:
o Continue the embargo and negotiations with Iran, or more accurately, maintain pressure on Iran, while continuing to target Iranian air defense systems, radars, and command and control centers if attacks on US forces and interests persist.
o Strengthen the naval and air presence in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea to protect international navigation and contain any Iranian attempt to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
* Iran:
o Continue carrying out calculated military responses against US bases and interests using missiles and drones, while attempting to avoid a large-scale direct confrontation.
o Intensify efforts to demonstrate the ability to threaten US and regional interests and raise the cost of military operations against them.
o Take a hard line politically on the nuclear issue, using international and military pressure as a bargaining chip in any potential diplomatic process.
* Israel:
o Continue raising military and defense readiness in anticipation of direct Iranian attacks or attacks through its allies in the region.
o Exploit the reduced effectiveness of some Iranian air defense and surveillance networks to expand the scope of intelligence or military operations if circumstances warrant. Continuing to support and encourage US pressure on Iran while avoiding being drawn into an open regional war unless it is subjected to a large-scale or qualitative attack.
Dr. Sayed Ghoneim
