As one of the continuing repercussions of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, the already sensitive Saudi–Houthi conflict, dating back to 2009, has intensified, particularly since February 28, 2026, when Iran entered into direct warfare with the United States and Israel for the first time in history.
Several factors have contributed to the recent escalation and lack of resolution in the Saudi–Houthi confrontation. Most notably, these include the UAE’s withdrawal from the Yemeni arena following its near-direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, the United States’ involvement in an ongoing war with Iran, and the direct threats facing all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. These developments are compounded by the absence of a clear and realistic Saudi vision for resolving Yemen’s internal divisions, regardless of the eventual political arrangement.
The consequences have extended beyond bilateral and regional conflicts to affect the international community. The continuing confrontations have disrupted vital energy resources in the Arabian Gulf and threatened two strategically important straits—Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz—along with the surrounding international shipping routes.
Consequently, countries theoretically outside the conflict have gradually become involved, either to secure international maritime routes affecting their interests, as demonstrated by the European naval operation ASPIDES, or to provide military support to countries directly involved in the conflicts because of interconnected strategic interests.
Examples include the military support Saudi Arabia currently receives from the United States, France, and Greece, as well as the Egyptian president’s recent declaration of readiness to respond to any Saudi request for military assistance.
The following questions may help explain Egypt’s latest position.
First: Why Might Egypt Provide Military Support to Saudi Arabia?
Beyond Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s membership in the League of Arab States—which has largely lost its role and identity—and the obligations arising from the 1950 Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation between Arab League States, Saudi Arabia’s importance to Egyptian national security can be assessed through seven considerations.
1. Religious security and stability
Saudi Arabia is home to Mecca and Medina, which hold fundamental religious and societal significance for Egypt, where Muslims constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. Any threat to these holy sites could immediately provoke spontaneous domestic reactions in Egypt that would be extremely difficult to control.
2. Egypt’s secure eastern strategic depth
Saudi Arabia provides Egypt with a secure eastern strategic depth, with important maritime and air dimensions. Geographically, it is closer than Egypt’s northern strategic depth, whose stability also fluctuates according to relations with Turkey.
Any collapse in Saudi security could complete a surrounding arc of instability around Egypt, potentially generating economic and military consequences exceeding Egypt’s available resources.
3. Saudi Arabia’s strategic weight in the Arabian Gulf
Saudi Arabia serves as a major strategic counterweight and supporting pillar for Egypt’s eastern strategic depth in the Arabian Gulf, despite competition or disagreements between Riyadh and certain GCC members.
Saudi stability and territorial cohesion contribute to protecting the Arabian Peninsula, regarded as Egypt’s eastern strategic depth, against Iranian threats influenced by the ideology of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
4. Saudi–Emirati disagreements and Egyptian interests in Africa
Differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE may, to some extent, help balance Egyptian interests in Africa, particularly regarding Sudan, Ethiopia, and Red Sea security, including Ethiopia’s efforts to secure access to the Red Sea.
5. Saudi Arabia’s financial and economic importance
The financial strength of the Saudi economy makes the Kingdom one of Egypt’s relatively low-cost sources of support during economic crises.
This was particularly evident after 2013 and, more recently, through various reconstruction and development projects involving Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, including the UAE and Qatar.
6. Egypt’s geostrategic importance to Saudi Arabia
Despite Saudi Arabia’s substantially greater financial resources, the Kingdom’s military and strategic experience has not necessarily kept pace with the scale of the challenges it faces, whether conflicts into which it has been drawn or those in which it has chosen to intervene.
Egypt therefore represents a potential source of military and strategic support, or at least a partner with converging interests across several interconnected regional issues.
7. Egypt as Saudi Arabia’s western strategic depth
Saudi Arabia also regards Egypt as part of its western strategic depth, making it particularly concerned with Egypt’s stability and with preventing any political or ideological transformation that could produce a hostile or competing regional power.
This concern was evident during 2011–2013, when Egypt’s political elite included a substantial Muslim Brotherhood presence, both before and during its period in government, with political orientations that fluctuated in different ways between Tehran and Ankara.
Second: What Is the Scale of Saudi Arabia’s Critical Assets Threatened by the Houthis and Iran?
Although a country’s vast territory and abundant natural resources provide substantial opportunities for prosperity and development, they also increase the security costs and challenges associated with protecting and sustaining its infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia covers approximately 2 million square kilometers—roughly twice Egypt’s territory—with population centers and infrastructure distributed across much of the country.
Its critical assets include:
- 9 major oil refineries.
- 142 onshore and offshore oil fields and wells.
- 25 major oil transportation and storage facilities.
- 20 major residential and industrial cities.
- Approximately 15 international airports.
- 7 major ports along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.
From an air operations perspective, applying a theoretical assumption that a medium-range air defense battalion can protect a concentration of critical assets within a 30-kilometer radius, Saudi Arabia would need to defend at least 135 critical targets across its territory.
This would require a minimum of 135 medium-range air defense battalions. However, such coverage would be extremely fragile.
Effective protection of each critical asset would require a layered air defense grouping comprising medium-range, short-range, and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), depending on the threat level.
Each category would require approximately four to six battalions or regiments to provide overlapping coverage and withstand the anticipated density of incoming aerial threats.
Accordingly, the assessment estimates that protecting 135 critical assets with a minimum of four units from each of the three categories would require approximately 1,620 air defense units.
Ballistic missile defense must be calculated separately, as conventional air defense systems are not technically capable of intercepting such threats.
Assuming theoretically that each missile defense battalion can protect a concentration of critical assets within a 100-kilometer radius, Saudi Arabia would require 61 missile defense battalions to protect its population centers, industrial facilities, and petroleum infrastructure against ballistic missile attacks, allocating only one battalion to each concentration.
Third: What Are Saudi Arabia’s Current Military Requirements?
Saudi Arabia’s military situation is currently divided between its position as one of the theaters affected by the US–Iranian war and its role as a principal party in the conflict between the Houthis and other Yemeni factions.
Despite this operational complexity, the similarity of the threats posed by Iran and the Houthis offers certain advantages in planning defensive responses.
The principal threats include:
- Ballistic missiles: Short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles operated by Iran and the Houthis, although their specific designations differ.
- Unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles: These weapons share broadly similar operational characteristics in terms of speed, flight altitude, guidance, and destructive effects.
- Explosive-laden suicide boats: These constitute a significant threat in the Red Sea theater. In 2017, the Saudi frigate Al Madinah was struck by a Houthi explosive-laden boat near the port of Hodeidah.
Countering these threats requires the following military capabilities.
1. Early-warning radars
Extensive radar coverage is required to establish an integrated radar surveillance network with the smallest possible coverage gaps, particularly in mountainous terrain and at low altitudes.
2. Missile defense systems
These systems have limited availability on the international arms market. According to the assessment, the principal manufacturers are the United States, Russia, China—whose systems are described as unproven—Israel, and South Korea.
3. Air defense systems and fighter aircraft
Particular emphasis should be placed on systems capable of engaging low- and very-low-altitude aerial targets, thereby increasing interception probabilities against cruise missiles and one-way attack UAVs.
4. Missile boats and corvettes
These naval platforms combine sufficient firepower to destroy explosive-laden boats with higher speeds than larger-displacement vessels such as frigates and destroyers.
Furthermore, the proximity of Saudi ports to the Yemeni theater reduces the operational need for larger vessels capable of prolonged deployments at sea.
Existing Saudi Military Capabilities
According to the assessment’s interpretation of The Military Balance 2026, Saudi Arabia possesses:
- 15 fighter squadrons, totaling 367 aircraft.
- 1 THAAD battery, assessed as capable of defending less than 2% of critical assets against ballistic missiles.
- 6 Patriot batteries, assessed as providing coverage for less than 10% of critical assets against cruise missiles and UAVs, and less than 0.5% against ballistic missiles.
- 5 VL MICA battalions assigned to the Royal Guard, assessed as protecting less than 0.5% of critical assets against cruise missiles and UAVs.
- 16 HAWK battalions, assessed as protecting less than 1% of critical assets against cruise missiles and UAVs.
- 17 short-range Shahine battalions, assessed as protecting less than 1.5% of critical assets against cruise missiles and UAVs.
- 16 major naval combatants, comprising 12 frigates and 4 corvettes, presumably distributed between the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf.
The assessment considers this naval force significantly insufficient relative to the requirements of protecting seven Saudi ports along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba.
Overall, the assessment estimates that Saudi Arabia can provide air and missile defense coverage for only 2.58% of its critical assets, with estimated coverage of 1.25% against ballistic missiles and 3.25% against UAVs and cruise missiles.
Fourth: What Form of Egyptian Military Support Could Saudi Arabia Receive?
Although Egypt has attempted to avoid direct involvement in the escalating regional conflict since October 7, 2023, the consequences have already affected its national interests.
These include disruptions to navigation through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with direct implications for shipping traffic through the Suez Canal, as well as the reported attack on Egyptian territory at the port of Damietta on July 29, 2026.
The situation has further escalated with direct threats to Saudi security, as the Kingdom has become involved in an open confrontation with the Houthis in Yemen.
Given these developments and their economic consequences for Egypt, any Egyptian military deployment to Saudi Arabia could have an uncertain duration.
This would complicate assessments of Egypt’s ability to sustain such assistance, not only financially but also militarily.
Deploying elements of the Egyptian Armed Forces abroad to defend another country would temporarily reduce the capabilities available for defending Egyptian territory.
The assessment estimates that such deployments would probably not exceed 25% of the relevant categories of Egyptian military equipment or force components.
Considering the previously identified threats, Egypt’s continuing security challenges along its western and southern borders, and the logistical advantages arising from similarities between Egyptian and Saudi weapons systems and ammunition, the assessment identifies several possible forms of support.
These projections draw on publicly available information, including The Military Balance, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and international defense manufacturers.
1. Air Defense Support
Egypt could potentially provide Saudi Arabia with the following capabilities.
E-2C Hawkeye airborne early-warning and command-and-control aircraft
These aircraft could enhance the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s radar surveillance network, which appears to contain significant coverage gaps.
HAWK air defense systems
Since Saudi Arabia operates the same system, deploying Egyptian HAWK units would simplify logistical and technical support, including replenishment of missiles expected to be consumed during operations through Saudi stocks.
Chaparral short-range air defense systems
These systems employ AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, which Saudi Arabia also possesses.
However, differences between missile variants could require modifications, potentially financed by Saudi Arabia.
Amoun air defense systems
The Amoun is a fixed-site air defense system employing AIM-7 Sparrow missiles, which are also available in Saudi Air Force inventories.
If necessary, these missiles could potentially be modified to replenish expended stocks rather than relying on Egyptian reserves.
SA-2 Volga air defense systems
Although these systems are relatively old and participated in the October 1973 War, the Egyptian Armed Forces have maintained their technical condition and operational effectiveness to high standards, according to the assessment.
As these systems are believed to be undergoing replacement by newer German systems, they could potentially be deployed to protect Saudi airspace against UAVs and cruise missiles.
The assessment argues that Egypt would face fewer concerns regarding the consumption of these missiles because the systems are likely approaching retirement.
F-16 fighter aircraft
Egyptian F-16s previously participated alongside Saudi forces in Operation Decisive Storm, conducting missions inside Yemen after 2015.
Their weapons are compatible with certain Saudi Air Force munitions, although technical and maintenance requirements would differ because Saudi Arabia does not operate the same aircraft type.
2. Ballistic Missile Defense
During the inauguration of Egypt’s Strategic Command Headquarters on July 4, 2026, Egypt announced that it possessed the S-300VM air and missile defense system.
However, the assessment considers it unlikely that Egypt would deploy these strategically sensitive systems to Saudi Arabia for two principal reasons.
- Limited availability: International sources estimate Egypt’s inventory at only three battalions, a relatively small number given the country’s territorial size and national defense requirements.
- Missile replenishment difficulties: Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine has placed considerable pressure on its defense industry, with Russian military requirements taking priority over deliveries to foreign customers. Consequently, replenishing missiles expended during a Saudi deployment could prove difficult.
3. Maritime Security Support
Egypt could potentially deploy naval combatants equipped with air defense capabilities to strengthen the protection of Saudi Arabia’s seven principal ports along its western coastline.
The most likely platforms include:
Gowind 2500 corvettes
Egypt operates four vessels of this class. They possess significant air defense capabilities through VL MICA surface-to-air missiles, which are also operated by Saudi Arabia.
MEKO A200 frigates
Egypt operates three vessels of this class. According to the assessment, they possess effective air defense capabilities using VL MICA missiles, which are also available in Saudi inventories.
FREMM frigates
Egypt operates three vessels of this class. These ships possess substantial air defense capabilities through Aster 15/30 surface-to-air missiles, which the assessment states are also available to Saudi Arabia.
Ahmed Adel Abdel Aal
Military Affairs Researcher
Researcher and Coordinator, Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA)
PhD Researcher in Strategic Studies, Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies
