I previously discussed the Iranian war triangle, where the two sides of the conflict are the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other. The third side is the theater of conflict, represented by the Arabian Gulf region and its six states.
It is clear that there is now a broader conflict involving all three sides, not just two. This conflict is over new regional security arrangements.
The regional security arrangements in the Arabian Gulf were part of the grand American strategy of “Overseas Balance,” and the United States aims to readjust them. Today, Iran aims to completely remove the United States from the Gulf region so that Tehran can formulate new security arrangements for itself without any external interference, arrangements that fully serve Iran’s interests and influence.
Conversely, as I previously assessed, Saudi Arabia may aim to replace the Shiite crescent with a Sunni crescent, potentially relying indirectly on Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt. However, as I mentioned before, this move will face significant challenges, especially given Saudi Arabia’s relative rapprochement with Iran to de-escalate tensions, Turkey’s pursuit of its own interests rather than a rigid Sunni axis, and Egypt’s avoidance of any approach based on sectarian ideology—a point of convergence with the UAE, which completely avoids ideological frameworks. Saudi Arabia, however, may not back down from this approach.
It seems to me that the Iranian and Saudi approaches are what prompted the UAE to immediately consider a new regional security system from its own perspective, one that transcends sectarian ideology. This approach is shared by Israel and other signatories of the Abraham Accords.
The remaining Gulf states are working to hedge their bets.
Here we have four competing projects:
1. A US-led international-regional project possessing the largest military force and alliances, potentially relying on a limited presence in the region.
2. An Iranian regional project without external powers or alliances, but which still wields influence through its proxies.
3. A Saudi project, a robust quantitative model, based on a massive economy built on resources and large investments, religious leadership, and OPEC.
4. An Emirati project, a pragmatic network model, with a diversified economy based on production, international and regional investments, and strong ties with key regional powers (Israel).
Note: The first and fourth projects appear complementary during the Trump era, but they would be competitive if they resumed operating within the framework of the core US strategy.
Dr. Sayed Ghoneim
